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I. A CASE OF FUTILE SELF-DEFENSE
Consider a case in which Wrongful Aggressor (WA) attacks and proceeds 
to slowly kill Innocent Victim (IV).  In the kind of case on which I want
to focus, I stipulate that nothing IV is able to do can prevent or even delay 
WA’s lethal onslaught. Moreover, I stipulate that nothing IV is able to do
can prevent WA or anyone else from engaging in wrongful aggression in the
future. But suppose IV is able to inflict a minor injury on WA, say, by
scratching his arm.  Both WA and IV are fully cognizant of all the facts I 
have specified thus far.  In case it is important, I also stipulate that IV’s
*  © 2018 Douglas Husak.  Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University. 
Thanks to Antony Duff, Gideon Yaffe, Peter Westen, Alec Walen, and Leo Zaibert for
helpful comments on earlier drafts.  I am also grateful to Peter Westen, Alec Walen, Uwe 
Steinhoff, and other members of the self-defense conference at the University of San 
Diego. 
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resistance can only make matters worse for IV.  If antagonized, WA may
proceed to cause more pain for IV, but not for others.  Thus my only
stipulation is that IV’s act will produce no reduction in the incidence
of wrongful aggression, either on the present occasion or in any future case.
I will say that the injury IV is able to inflict on WA is futile and will describe
the particular case on which I focus as an instance of futile self-defense.
The issue I propose to examine is how we might be able to defend the
judgment that IV is morally permitted to inflict the minor injury on WA.1 
The burgeoning self-defense literature, like that in most areas of moral
and legal philosophy, typically begins with and seeks to rationalize our 
intuitions.2 I submit that the intuitive judgment of virtually all respondents,
at least initially, is that IV is permitted to exercise her right of self-defense, 
however futile, and scratch WA.  This intuition, I believe, is incredibly
powerful and robust; I certainly have it myself.  Yet quite a few philosophers 
and legal theorists contend IV is not permitted to employ futile self-
defense against WA.3  Presumably, they believe IV must passively accept her 
fate without injuring WA.4 Why hold this counterintuitive judgment? Two
possible answers are available.  First, contrary to my generalization about
what most respondents are likely to believe initially, these philosophers may 
not share my intuition that IV is permitted to injure WA when resistance is
futile. Second, these philosophers might share this intuition initially, but
ultimately reject it on theoretical grounds. I find it hard to believe the first 
answer explains why many philosophers contend that IV’s act is impermissible.
Virtually all respondents, as I have said, begin with the initial intuition 
that IV is permitted to scratch WA, although it is hard to know how to
respond to those philosophers who disagree. 
In what follows, I focus on the second answer, which I regard as more
common and plausible.  Philosophers who eventually reject their intuition
and come around to holding that IV is not permitted to injure WA do
so because they are unable to bring their initial judgment into reflective
equilibrium with other particular judgments and general principles they
1. I do not address whether WA would be wronged or is liable to defensive force 
by IV.  It is now widely accepted that judgments that IV’s act is permissible do not entail
that WA is not wronged by IV’s conduct.  It is hard for me to believe WA is wronged or
is not liable to the injury inflicted by IV, but these conclusions require further argument, 
so I do not discuss them here.  Nor do I discuss the application of my thoughts to war—
the context to which many other moral and legal philosophers apply them. 
2. See, e.g., Suzanne Uniacke, Self-Defence, Just War, and a Reasonable Prospect of
Success, in HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR 62, 62 (Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang eds., 
2014).
3. See, e.g., id. at 66 (“[I]f B does not believe at the time of action that the force 
he uses is capable of fending off A’s threat to some extent, then he cannot justify it as
self-defence or attempted self-defence.”).
4. See id. 
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hold about self-defense.  Of course, nothing is methodologically suspect 
about a procedure by which initial intuitions are rejected because they fail
to withstand the test of reflective equilibrium.  Unless some such initial 
intuitions were eventually rejected on this ground, we could simply rely on
them without the need to subject them to reflective equilibrium in the first
place.  Nonetheless, I will try to defend the initial intuition that IV is permitted 
to employ futile self-defense against WA.  I will endeavor to show that our
intuition about this case does not really contradict some of the other 
particular judgments and general principles about self-defense we should 
hold. This effort, however, is necessarily incomplete.  I make no systematic
effort to show that this intuition is compatible with the judgments we are 
likely to make about every case in which self-defense is permissibly exercised. 
II. TWO PRELIMINARIES
Before proceeding further, I make two preliminary observations I believe
to be important. First, I readily concede that my case in wholly unrealistic.  
To be sure, nothing is unrealistic about a scenario in which victims of 
aggression can do nothing to avoid their fate at the hands of determined 
and powerful wrongdoers.  What is unrealistic, I submit, is my stipulation that
IV knows that nothing she can do will reduce harm, both on the present
occasion as well as in the future.  Stipulations of omniscience are utterly 
fanciful, sometimes contributing to the bad name philosophers of self-
defense have earned among more practically-minded legal theorists.  The
latter sometimes scoff at the supposition that much can be learned about
the world we inhabit by reflecting on fantastic scenarios in which fat men
are pushed down narrow wells on top of victims who happen to possess
vaporizing ray guns.5  On the planet in which we live, I am relatively certain
innocent victims would believe, and certainly would hope, there to be a
non-trivial chance that some future harm will be averted because of their
resistance.  Even if IV assigns only a 1% probability to this contingency, would
anyone think she should still abstain from scratching WA? 
Suppose IV believes there is a miniscule chance that some future harm
would be prevented by scratching WA.  But suppose further that the facts
ultimately prove her to be mistaken; WA turns out not to be slowed in the
slightest. On a prospective theory of permissibility, IV’s act of futile self-
5. See e.g., Larry Alexander, The Need to Attend to Probabilities—For Purposes 
of Self-Defense and Other Preemptive Actions, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 223, 227 (2018). 
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defense might well turn out to be justified after all.6  On the evidence
available to her, she may be warranted in holding the belief that makes her
conduct permissible.  Even on an objective theory of permissibility— the 
omniscient or god’s eye point of view—many of those who pronounce IV’s
act of futile self-defense to be wrongful would apply their views about 
mistaken justification to deem her act to be excused.7  This concession should
do little to cheer IV, who in any case has been killed by the villainous 
WA. I am not primarily interested in determining whether IV should be 
excused and therefore be blameless, but I present a reason to conclude her 
act of futile self-defense is objectively justified, that is, objectively 
permissible all-things-considered. 
Why is the lack of realism about my case important?  Philosophers will 
respond to the practically-minded legal theorists to whom I referred by
insisting a great deal can be learned about the principles at stake in debates 
about self-defense by identifying pure cases, and the purity of these cases
is best assured by resorting to stipulation, no matter how fanciful.8  Of course, 
they have a point.  At the same time, however, intuitions about cases are more
likely to become increasingly unreliable as they deviate further and further 
from reality.  I have stipulated that the effort to injure will be futile, but
laypersons are bound to express their awareness that this stipulation departs
from their experience in the real world by allowing IV to injure WA.  Even 
seasoned philosophers who report intuitions about particular cases should
never be supremely confident that their reactions do not reflect their lack 
of certainty that the case in question conforms to whatever unrealistic
facts are stipulated.9 
Second, despite the title of my paper and the description I have provided to
the central case involving IV and WA, I readily concede that this example may
literally involve neither self-defense nor futility.  It may be hard to agree 
that IV is defending herself when she recognizes all too well that nothing 
6. For an introduction to prospective views, see generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN,
LIVING WITH UNCERTAINTY: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF IGNORANCE (2008).
7. I make the—admittedly controversial—assumption that IV’s mistaken belief 
about averting present or future harm is reasonable and that reasonable mistakes about 
justifications constitute excuses.
8. See Alexander, supra note 5.
9. I know no one who has actually pushed a fat man from a bridge.  I would wager,
however, that few attempts to do so would succeed in placing the man directly on the track 
below so that the oncoming trolley will be derailed and not run over the five innocent 
victims in its path.  I would predict that the more likely outcome would be that the trolley
would proceed on its way and the injury to the fat man would be wholly ineffective.
If I am correct, intuitive judgments against pushing the fat man may reflect the lack of
confidence that the plan will actually work.
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she can do will make an iota of difference to whether she will survive.10 
According to Suzanne Uniacke, “a person who acts in self-defence aims
to fend off injury or reduce its severity.”11  I believe it is sensible to say 
IV has the aim Uniacke mentions; IV may be trying—or aiming—to fend
off injury or reduce its severity even when she knows she cannot possibly
succeed.12  People can and do try to accomplish ends they know are
unattainable. But I will not resort to these contested grounds to pass judgment
on IV.  My question is simply whether such an injury is permissibly inflicted;
whether we conceptualize its permissibility under the description of trying 
or within the rubric of self-defense may be important for some purpose 
but, to me, is immaterial.13  I do not care whether the rationale for allowing 
IV to scratch WA falls inside or outside the narrow parameters of self-defense. 
Moreover, the term futile is ambiguous, and we must be careful to specify 
what sense applies before we can be clear about whether it pertains to the
case at hand.  Resistance is futile, in one sense, if it can avert no harm for
anyone in the present or future.14  Resistance is futile in this first sense. 
But resistance may not be futile in a different sense.  Resistance is futile,
in a second sense, if it is wholly wanton or pointless.  No philosopher of
who I am aware thinks the infliction of an injury can be permissible when 
it is futile in this second sense.15  It is an open question, and exactly the point 
at issue, whether the use of force by IV and the subsequent injury to WA 
is wanton and pointless. My arguments will attempt to show that such force
by IV is not futile in this second sense.  I endeavor to find a plausible rationale 
to justify the force. 
10. Some think “a harm must have some chance of averting a threat if it is to count 
as defensive.” HELEN FROWE, DEFENSIVE KILLING 100 (2014).
11. Uniacke, supra note 2, at 68. 
12. See Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics
of Armed Conflicts 4 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a discussion
of why people might try even when they might not succeed, see CAROL S. DWECK,
MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 4, 42 (updated ed. 2016) (“[T]hey didn’t even 
think they were failing.  They thought they were learning.”).
13. See Steinhoff, supra note 12 (“[S]elf-defense need not be aimed at averting or 
mitigating an attack . . . .”).  Steinhoff therefore concludes that “resistance is self-defense.”
Id. at 9.  But he agrees that the ultimate question is whether IV acts justifiably, not whether 
his act is an instance of self-defense. See id. at 20. 
14. Id. at 12 (introducing a second type of self-defense under the umbrella of futility;
this necessarily means futility is ambiguous, and the definition of futility must be specified). 
15. Id. (differentiating between resistance that is both punitive and self-defensive, 
and resistance that is purely punitive). 
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As I have indicated, the great majority of moral and legal philosophers 
who share but ultimately reject the initial intuition that IV is permitted to
inflict a minor injury on WA probably do so because they are unable to 
bring this judgment into reflective equilibrium with other particular judgments 
and general principles they hold about self-defense.16  What are these 
particular judgments and general principles that lead thoughtful philosophers 
to renounce their earlier intuition?  Penal theorists almost universally accept 
the general principle that harms inflicted in self-defense are permissible
only when they are necessary.17  The necessity requirement is widely thought 
to undermine the supposition that IV’s use of futile self-defense, in the
first of the foregoing senses, is permissible.18  How can it be necessary to 
inflict an injury that is stipulated to achieve no reduction in wrongful 
aggression, either on the present occasion or in the future?19  If we are
tempted to relax the necessity requirement, as we might be forced to do to 
retain the intuition in my original case involving futile self-defense, we 
then seem to encounter difficulties retaining particular judgments we tend to 
make about other kinds of cases.  The most familiar of those cases involve
retreat. Consider a different example that preserves the stipulation that 
the minor injury would not slow WA.  However, in this new variation IV 
knows she can retreat with perfect safety, so no one need suffer injury at 
all. May IV now stand her ground and injure WA, or is retreat required? 
It may be manifestly irrational for IV to remain in place and die after scratching
WA, but does IV act impermissibly if she elects to do so?  If defensive force
can be permissible even when it is unnecessary, why are so many moral
and legal philosophers convinced that IV must escape rather than injure WA?
Abandoning the original intuition that IV is permitted to scratch WA in 
an act of futile self-defense is the easiest way to avoid reflective disequilibrium
 16. See id. at n.473. 
17. As Steinhoff points out, although the necessity constraint is almost universally
accepted, almost no philosopher bothers to defend it. Id. at 58. 
18. The necessity requirement maintains that the defender must only do what is
necessary “to advance some valuable aim” to stop the aggression; any further harm is
impermissible. Id. at 41. 
19. More generally, it might be thought that only desert can permit a harm that does
not produce good consequences in the future.  See Fred Feldman & Brad Skow, Desert, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desert [https://
perma.cc/8237-2TYQ].  I am skeptical.  The reasons generated by deontological considerations 
might also justify harming that does not increase personal value.  See Larry Alexander & 
Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 17, 2016), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ [https://perma.cc/94HX-FPL9].  Suppose, 
for example, my child was kidnapped. I, or some agent acting on my behalf, might be permitted 
to inflict minor harms on someone to rescue the child.  I ought to rescue my child and if 
inflicting harm is necessary to that end, I am permitted to do so.
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between the intuition and our judgments about other specific cases and
general principles.  Thus some philosophers are reluctantly led to conclude 
that IV is not permitted to scratch WA in what I have stipulated to be an
act of futile self-defense.20  Presumably, IV must resign herself to her fate 
and make no effort to add to the amount of unnecessary harm in the world 
by injuring WA. The initial intuition to the contrary might be deemed unreliable 
on several grounds. Most notably, it might reflect a commitment to an
indefensible macho culture.21 Those who abandon this initial intuition might
smugly take themselves to occupy the moral high ground. After all, inflicting 
injury is a prima facie or pro tanto wrong, and inflicting an unnecessary 
injury is a wrong that cannot be justified all things considered.22  Only
Neanderthals who hold a regressive conception of morality would allow 
IV to add to the quantum of unnecessary harm in the world.23 
Frankly, I regard my intuition that IV is permitted to inflict a futile injury
on WA by scratching him to be at least as strong as the allegedly conflicting 
intuition that IV is morally required to flee when she knows escape is possible
and no one need be injured at all.  Admittedly, the strength of given intuitions 
is hard to quantify.  But if our judgments about this pair of examples are 
truly incompatible so that one must be jettisoned, I am just as prepared to 
rethink the need for escape as the claim that minor injuries become
20. This theory is generally based on the foundation of natural rights philosophy.
John Locke was a prominent natural rights philosopher and his writings were highly
influential to the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of America and, as such,
natural law philosophy is foundational to our individualistic, freedom-based society. See 
Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, 
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 52 (1985).  For a basic 
explanation of John Locke’s ideas and how the natural rights philosophy operates, see 
Steven Forde, John Locke and the Natural Law and Natural Rights Tradition, NAT’L L.,
NAT’L RTS., & AM. CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011), http://www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/locke
[https://perma.cc/6X6C-R24D].
21. For a discussion on how increasing levels of aggression add to a culture of
“macho” masculinity, see Thomas Page McBee, The End of Violent, Simplistic, Macho 
Masculinity, ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/
11/the-end-of-violent-simplistic-macho-masculinity/265585/ [https://perma.cc/5DJP-HU2F]. 
22. See David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Aug. 22, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political/#HarPri [https:// 
perma.cc/KJ7V-LVAT].
23. See Steinhoff, supra note 12, at 15 (discussing German law’s requirement that
milder retaliation is only justifiable if it is as effective as harsher retaliation).  Steinhoff argues: 
normative values work to equate permissible infliction of self-defense and the proscriptive,
rose-tinted utopian ideal of the “duty to retreat.” Id. at 72. 
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impermissible when they are known to be futile.24  In short, I am strongly 
tempted to restore reflective equilibrium by holding that IV is not required
to retreat rather than standing her ground to scratch WA. The case against 
the need for retreat is strongest when IV is attacked in her home—the
so-called “castle doctrine” that all jurisdictions recognize.25  But is this 
judgment really inconsistent with my intuition about the original example 
in which retreat is unavailable? One might deny that an intuition that
permits futile injuring in cases in which IV can do something to prevent
the harm inflicted by WA—by retreating with perfect safety—has any 
implications for cases in which IV is able to do nothing to prevent WA’s
onslaught.  Hopefully, my view is not inconsistent with the need for retreat 
in my modified example.
Is my intuition about my original example at odds with those about
other cases? Perhaps. I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive position 
that yields clear answers to every variation on the example of futile self-
defense. Here are two troublesome cases, all too familiar to theorists who
are steeped in the self-defense literature. First, what if WA is not culpable 
for his aggression?26  He cannot be prevented from killing IV, but he poses 
a threat only because of duress;27 a member of his town is held hostage
and would be slaughtered unless he agrees to attack a single innocent victim.
I admit that the absence of culpability may require a change in some 
considerations to which I will eventually appeal.  Second, what if WA is 
not even an agent whose aggressive behavior is voluntary?28  He cannot
be prevented from killing IV, but he poses a threat only because he is
pushed or shoved into IV. I admit that the absence of agency may also
require a change in some considerations to which I will eventually appeal. 
I am sure many factors play a complex role in a complete theory of self-
defense; it is unlikely one master principle will emerge to provide a 
satisfactory account of all our many nuanced judgments. 
At the same time, I hasten to add that the judgment that IV is not permitted 
to inflict a futile but minor injury on WA in my original case is also difficult 
to bring into reflective equilibrium with what we are likely to believe about
other particular cases and general principles.  If we renounce the intuitive 
judgment that IV’s act is permissible, we may be forced to rethink some
of these other judgments as well.  I mention two more examples.  Most of 
24. This position is also accepted by Helen Frowe in her discussion of the thought
experiment she calls Lucky Escape. Helen Frowe, Non-Combatant Liability in War, in
HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR, supra note 2, at 172, 186. 
25. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 888 n.32 (2010). 
26. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 
104 ETHICS 252, 263–64 (1994). 
27. Id. at 264. 
28. See, e.g., McMahan, supra note 26, at 265. 
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the time, third parties who are aware of all the facts are not permitted to 
assist a person in a confrontation unless the behavior of the person assisted
is permissible.  Suppose IV’s friend can assist her in scratching WA but
is no more able to stop or slow WA than IV.  If we reject my intuition and 
conclude that IV is not permitted to inflict a futile injury, it seemingly
follows that her friend can do nothing to assist her in scratching WA. 
Perhaps this judgment is no more difficult to swallow than the claim that 
IV herself may not injure WA. 
But, I submit, matters get even more counterintuitive when we turn to 
whether third parties are required to intervene to prevent IA from scratching 
WA. When the aggressor cannot be stopped or slowed, IV’s friend not
only may not assist her but also should take WA’s side and prevent her from
scratching him.29  Obviously, IV would not be expected to welcome these
results. She not only is wrongfully killed by WA but goes to her death
feeling betrayed by her friend as well.  Why would IV’s friend deliberately
take the side of evil over good and arguably become complicit with it? 
These counterintuitive implications can be blocked by refusing to reach any
conclusions about the permissibility of third-party assistance or prevention 
from judgments about what first-parties—namely IV—are permitted to
do. But this amounts to an additional normative cost that must be borne 
by those who continue to insist IV may not inflict a futile injury on WA. 
Additional seemingly strange results follow if IV is not permitted to 
scratch WA. Do wrongdoers such as WA acquire more immunity from
defensive harm when they are able to become more impervious to it—by 
killing under circumstances in which resistance is certain to be futile 
rather than those in which resistance might be effective in deterring future 
aggression?30  The more determined the wrongdoer, the less IV is 
permitted to do to him.  Perhaps this seemingly unacceptable consequence 
can be blocked as well.  Again, however, some ingenuity is required to do 
so. I certainly do not pretend to have identified or resolved all possibilities 
of reflective disequilibrium.  I simply point out that some amount of 
reflective disequilibrium is likely to be encountered regardless of what 
judgment we ultimately make about the original case involving IV and WA.
 29. See Jeff McMahan, The Limits of Self-Defense, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE
183, 193–94 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016). 
30. See Joanna Mary Firth & Jonathan Quong, Necessity, Moral Liability and Defensive 
Harm, 31 L. & PHIL. 673, 688 (2012). 
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The initial intuition permitting IV to scratch WA should not be abandoned 
casually; we should not surrender it without making a concerted effort to 
salvage it. Most theorists try to do so by arguing—as I will do—that it 
can be brought into reflective equilibrium with other specific intuitions 
and general principles we are inclined to accept.31  As I have indicated,
nearly all philosophers agree that persons who employ self-defense are
permitted to inflict an injury only when it is necessary.32  Because I have 
stipulated that IV’s scratch of WA will do nothing to prevent present or 
future aggression, it might seem that IV’s act fails to satisfy the necessity
constraint for permissible self-defense.  But how exactly should we construe 
the necessity constraint?  Seth Lazar is among the handful of philosophers 
who have sought to analyze what this principle involves.33  According to 
Lazar, a harmful action such as that taken by IV against WA is necessary
when it satisfies each of the following three conditions: 
1.	 “The harmful course of action must advance a goal.  It must 
be neither wholly wanton, nor an end in itself.”34 
2.	 “No less harmful course of action has equal or better prospects
of achieving the goal.”35 
3.	 “If there is a less harmful course of action that could achieve 
the goal, but is less likely to succeed, then the difference in 
prospects of success—or effectiveness—must be enough to
justify the difference in harm inflicted.”36 
I propose a few modifications of Lazar’s analysis.  First, the goal to which 
he refers in each of these conditions must be valuable. Not just any goal 
will show an injury to be necessary. But with this refinement to Lazar’s
conditions, along with a second I will discuss in Part V, we should be 
prepared to entertain the possibility that IV might achieve a valuable goal
even though she is unable to avert either present or future harm by WA.37 
In other words, IV’s act may be necessary because it advances a valuable 
31. See, e.g., Daniel Statman, On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense, 
118 ETHICS 659, 668–69 (2008). 
32. See, e.g., Seth Lazar, Necessity in Self-Defense and War, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
3, 4 (2012). 
33. See SETH LAZAR, SPARING CIVILIANS 26 (2015).
34. Id. 
35. Id.
 36. Id. 
37. See Statman, supra note 31 (arguing harmful courses of conduct may be justified
because they serve utilitarian or non-utilitarian purposes). 
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goal even though her resistance to WA is futile in the first sense I have 
specified. The most well-known candidate for such a valuable goal is 
described by Daniel Statman.38  According to Statman, the good IV produces 
by injuring WA consists in the vindication of her “honor.”39  “Sometimes
the goal [of defensive harm] is not to defend the life . . . of the victims but 
rather their honor.”40  He continues, “in the eyes of the aggressor, we are 
just items to be used, mere objects. . . . We feel that we must protect not 
only our body or our property but our selves.”41  Thus, Statman contends
that a victim such as IV faces two distinct threats: (1) a direct physical 
threat to her life; and (2) a secondary threat to her honor.42  To Statman,
IV’s defense of her honor from this secondary threat may render given 
defensive acts necessary, including the scratch IV inflicts on WA in my
original example.43 
Statman’s account is on the right track.  It is tempting to suppose that 
the fact that IV goes down fighting makes her better off.  When we ask
what kind of life IV led, that is, when we assess the value of her life overall, 
we want to know what kind of death she had.  The fact that she did not succumb
without a struggle might produce a good for IV herself.  Nonetheless, I
propose to suggest a somewhat different account—or at least an important and
novel way of understanding. Statman’s view has been roundly criticized,44 and 
I too am skeptical that honor is the best candidate for the valuable goal 
that is achieved by the futile efforts of IV.  In particular, suppose IV is
motivated to scratch WA by some consideration other than to maintain her
honor, possibly by sheer hatred for WA.  Should we then deem her act to 
be unjustified?  Although a few alternatives to Statman’s candidate have been 
proposed,45 I make no effort to canvass and assess them here.  Instead, I will
describe what I hope to be a more original and plausible basis for bringing 
our intuitions about futile self-defense into reflective equilibrium with our 
judgments about other specific cases and general principles.  I am sure my
 38. See id.




 43. See id. at 668–69. 
44. See generally, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Honor and Beyond: 
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Seemingly Futile Defense and Permissible Harming, 
15 J. MORAL PHIL. (forthcoming 2018). 
45.  Firth & Quong, supra note 30, at 693; Frowe, supra note 24, at 185–86. 
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To my knowledge, a common theme pervades attempts to bring the 
initial intuition that IV is permitted to scratch WA into reflective equilibrium
with other specific cases and general principles: contrary to what we 
might have supposed by the stipulation that no present or future harm will
be averted by IV’s scratch, each such attempt contends that she does manage 
to advance a valuable goal or objective by injuring WA after all.  However, 
without preventing present harm or reducing future harm the good that IV 
allegedly produces by advancing this goal or objective is presumably intrinsic; 
it is not a good that owes its value to its contribution to some other good. 
Statman’s view, as I understand it, attempts to identify such an intrinsic 
good.46  Presumably, it is better for IV to die with some modicum of honor
than to die without it, and the value of so doing does not owe its goodness 
to its contribution to any further value.47  Honor is an intrinsic good—or
so the story goes. 
Recall I earlier indicated that acts of self-defense are not futile in the 
second sense distinguished in Part I unless they are utterly pointless and 
gratuitous.48  This account of futility may appear to duplicate the first
condition of Lazar’s analysis of necessity, which specifies that “[t]he harmful 
course of action must advance a goal.  It must [not] be . . .wholly wanton.”49 
In fact, however, my condition of non-futility differs in the following crucial 
respect from Lazar’s account.  Why should we concede that only the advancement
of a goal or objective that is intrinsically good can show IV’s scratch not 
to be wholly wanton?  Why include in a single condition what seem to be
two separate requirements: that IV’s act is (1) not gratuitous and (2) advances
a valuable goal? What is required to show IV’s act is not gratuitous or wanton? 
Is it not the attainment of an end or objective that is intrinsically good, but
rather a reason that justifies and thus permits IV to injure WA?  Not all
actions pursuant to justificatory reasons advance goals or objectives. Perhaps
we can identify such a justificatory reason in my original case even though 
IV does not advance a goal or objective of any kind that we would
characterize as having value—intrinsic or otherwise. 
46. Statman, supra note 31, at 668 (asserting honor is intrinsically valuable because 
it reaffirms our worth to ourselves and to society). 
47. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Dec. 24, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/ [https://
perma.cc/6UD2-5FV6]. 
48. See supra Part II. 
49. LAZAR, supra note 33. 
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I am generally skeptical that the search for an intrinsic value that is
produced by IV’s act adds much to the debate.  Among other problems, it 
is notoriously difficult to defend any claim about intrinsic value.  This
difficulty is compounded if we believe intrinsic goods can consist of organic 
unities, some parts of which are typically bad outside of the wholes
of which they are a part.50  All too often a theorist believes some action is
permissible or impermissible and simply alleges that intrinsic value is gained 
or lost when the permissible or impermissible action is performed.  Is paving
the Grand Canyon wrong even if a net balance of instrumental goods
would be advanced by turning it into a parking lot?  Yes—or no—because
the Grand Canyon has—or lacks—intrinsic value.  Is the destruction of the last 
member of a species wrong even if a balance of instrumental goods would
be achieved by the extinction? Yes—or no—because the preservation of a
species has—or lacks—intrinsic value.  Similar questions can be raised about
the supposed intrinsic value of honor.  Unless some independent argument
can be provided for any of these claims about intrinsic value, I fear they
do no more than restate and thus add nothing new to the first-order judgments
they are designed to support. 
How do we minimize controversy by my suggested shift from a search
for a goal or objective advanced by IV to a search for a reason that justifies
IV’s act? Are debates not about reasons every bit as intractable as 
controversies about intrinsic value?  Just as importantly, how do we avoid 
controversies about intrinsic value by my suggested shift?  Does conformity 
with a justifying reason not produce intrinsic value?  Perhaps not.  The 
supposition that intrinsic value is produced by conformity with each justifying 
reason is asserted more often than defended.  Presumably, the fact that
your child has died is a good reason for you to feel sad.  Even more obviously, 
the fact that you admit to engaging in irritating behavior toward me provides
a good reason for me to be irritated.  If so, however, it is hardly obvious
that a world in which persons are sad or irritated by the appropriate stimuli
includes more intrinsic value than a world in which they are not.  The 
claim that greater amounts of sadness or irritation can make the world contain 
more value seems a bit strange—although I do not regard this oddity as a 
proof of anything.  I simply mention that the supposed intrinsic value of
these psychological states seems no less counterintuitive than that of suffering,
which foes of some axiological defenders of retributivism are fond of 
50. See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 206 (2006). 
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labeling as misguided or “barbaric.”51  My own suspicion, which I am 
unable to develop here, is that conformity with some justifying reasons 
creates intrinsic value while conformity with others does not.  I will not,
however, suggest a device by which given reasons can be sorted into one
category or the other. 
Thus questions about intrinsic value may not be involved in my inquiry.
Even if intrinsic value is not produced when IV injures WA in an act of 
futile self-defense, she may still have a reason that justifies her act.  If we 
had the opportunity to subject IV to a dialogue, the following pattern of 
questions and answers would be perfectly sensible.  Suppose we asked IV: 
“Why, that is, for what good reason did you injure WA?”  It would not be
surprising for her to answer: “Because he is a wrongful aggressor who
threatened me with wrongful harm.”  But we should press further and ask 
IV: “Why does this reason justify injuring WA?” This latter question
remains unanswered when the injury IV inflicts is futile.  We should not 
assume, however, that IV’s answer must be unintelligible unless she can
point to an intrinsically valuable good or objective that is furthered by her
act. In what follows, I try to provide a plausible answer to the unanswered
question: a reason that is capable of making her act permissible.  To this
point, I hope only to have raised a doubt that an adequate solution must 
identify some intrinsically valuable goal or objective IV’s action advances.
VI. IMPERSONAL VALUE AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
To show why IV’s act of scratching WA is permissible, we need
to identify a justifying reason.  Although conformity with this reason may 
create value, it need not do so to provide the needed justification.  I try to 
articulate such a reason here—a reason that exists even if my conjecture
in Part V is mistaken.  Suppose, in other words, that IV must show not
only that she has a reason to scratch WA but also that her act of futile self-
defense promotes a good or value if she is to succeed in justifying it.
Presumably, this good or value must be sufficiently great to outweigh the 
value of WA’s unscratched arm.  What good could IV possibly create?  I 
begin to answer this question by pointing out that the foregoing attempts 
to identify this value share a second common theme: they contend not only 
that IV does produce an intrinsic good by injuring WA, but also that the 
51. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., June 18,
2014, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive [https://perma.cc/SAB5-4WPU]
(quoting VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 63 (2011)). 
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intrinsic good she produces is a good for IV. That is, they contend that the
good IV produces is a “personal” good.52 
Whatever its advantages or disadvantages may be, it is likely Statman’s
view that IV is permitted to scratch WA to vindicate her honor involves 
an attempt to identify a personal good her act achieves.53  One might well 
think that maintaining her honor is good for IV.  I submit, however, that 
if IV’s reason for scratching WA creates an intrinsic good at all—which I 
am unsure we should concede—at least part of the intrinsic good she 
creates is better construed as “impersonal,” that is, as a value that is not
valuable for IV, or indeed for anyone.54  I take for granted that impersonal
goods exist,55 and the value created by conformity to IV’s reason to injure
WA is a plausible candidate to serve as an example.  In what does this 
alleged impersonal value consist?  It consists, I believe, in implementing, 
realizing, or instantiating a moral principle that supports the permissibility
of her conduct.  Reasonable minds will differ about exactly how this
principle should be formulated.56 My own rough approximation is that the
futile force exerted against WA by IV implements, realizes, or instantiates 
the principle that good should not capitulate—or yield—to evil.57 I suggest
implementation of this principle constitutes a great part of the good that 
justifies IV’s act.  If we insist on expressing the implementation of this
principle in terms of value, we should say that a world in which this principle 
is instantiated is a world that contains more value than a world in which it
is not. More specifically, we should say that a world in which IV acts as 
she has reason to do and thus does not capitulate to evil—for example, to
WA—contains more value than a world in which she succumbs without 
resistance.58 
We are easily misled if we conceptualize the implementation of justificatory 
principles as goals or objectives that are furthered or promoted; values can
be and are created by conformity to principle, even though nothing we should 
52. Statman, supra note 31, at 682. 
53. See id. at 671. 
54. Erich Hatala Matthes, Impersonal Value, Universal Value, and the Scope of 
Cultural Heritage, 125 ETHICS 999, 1000 (2015). 
55. But see generally RICHARD KRAUT, AGAINST ABSOLUTE GOODNESS (2011). In 
my judgment, the clearest cases to show the existence of such goods involve non-identity
problems.  Kraut fails to discuss these cases. 
56. Compare id. at 184, with Statman, supra note 31, at 670. 
57. Alternatively, right should not capitulate—or yield—to wrong. 
58. See JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 8 (2009); F. M. Kamm, Self-Defense,
Resistance, and Suicide, in HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR, supra note 2, at 75, 81. 
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call a goal is served.  Moreover, the good IV creates by instantiating this
principle need not be a good for her or for anyone. We need not point to
some person whose life has improved when we claim that a world in 
which good does not capitulate to evil is better than a world in which it 
does not. Somewhat more controversial is the issue of whether the
exercise of futile force against WA creates value even if there is a better 
principle she might have instantiated.59  Those who suspect acts of futile 
force are not justified might insist that IV should instead have furthered
the competitive principle good should not capitulate—or yield—to evil,
but only when instrumental value is thereby produced.60  Whether this
latter principle is indeed superior to its predecessor is one way to capture
precisely what is at issue between those who affirm and those who deny
that IV is justified to scratch WA.  We are again left with intuitions about
how the original case should be resolved, and I am aware of no non-
question-begging consideration that can move the debate forward.
My formulation of the principle implemented—or realized or instantiated 
—when IV injures WA is rough. By that I mean my candidate is only an
approximation of a more nuanced and refined version of the principle we 
should ultimately endorse.  Although we accept some version of the principle
that good should not capitulate to evil, that version does not entail IV using
any amount of force, under any circumstances, against WA.  Most importantly, 
the principle must be qualified by considerations of proportionality.61 
Because IV attains some amount of impersonal value by not yielding to evil 
does not entail that she is permitted, as George Fletcher once suggested,
to treat WA as having no more moral significance than a fly.62  But I will 
not try to identify the additional qualifications or refinements that must be 
made to the justificatory principle that IV implements when she scratches
WA.63  Any extended attempt to do so would need to establish a new reflective
equilibrium with a further set of specific cases and general principles.  My 
main contribution is not to articulate a polished version of this principle 
and to defend it against all challenges, but to suggest that the permissibility
of the injury inflicted by IV on WA can be supported by reference to a 
deontological consideration, the implementation of which need not produce
a personal value for anyone—and perhaps need not be conceptualized to 
produce a value at all. 
59. See, e.g., Kamm, supra note 58, at 79. 
60. See MCMAHAN, supra note 58, at 9. 
61. See Uniacke, supra note 2, at 63–64. 
62. George P. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND  VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 175, 183 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder eds., 1993). 
63. I leave open the questions of how these proportionality constraints should be
formulated and how they resemble or differ from those that apply to clear cases of self-
defense. 
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I am not the first philosopher to suggest impersonal as well as personal
values might be created when persons act in self-defense—futile or otherwise.64 
Jeff McMahan, for example, writes that “harms to which people are liable 
are bad not only for those who suffer them but also from an impersonal 
point of view.”65  However, as this quotation suggests, the values McMahan
considers in this context are impersonal bads.66 To be sure, McMahan
suggests that deserved harms are not impersonally bad.67  The “harms to 
which people are liable . . . . are never of merely neutral or positive impersonal 
value, unless of course they are harms that the victim also deserves to suffer.”68 
Thus treating a wrongdoer as he deserves does not create an impersonal
bad, even if he deserves to be harmed.  Why not? Many retributivists 
on punishment would answer that conformity with principles of desert
creates an intrinsic good.69  Many would allege WA does deserve the scratch 
IV is able to inflict—and a whole lot more that is beyond WA’s power.70 
But I hope not to resort to controversial claims about desert to make the 
case that impersonal value is created when IV scratches WA.  That is, we
should not suppose that no intrinsic good can be created when IV harms 
WA unless he deserves to be harmed; conformity with principles of desert
need not be the only basis on which reasons can justify behavior and intrinsic
goods may be created.  Implementation of the principle good should not 
capitulate—or yield—to evil might also provide a justificatory reason and
create an intrinsic impersonal value.71  This value could be furthered even
if we concede WA does not deserve the injury he suffers. 
We might be unsure whether to accept the principle that good should 
not capitulate to evil, but it seems at least as powerful, probably even more 
64.  See, e.g., Kamm, supra note 58.  Frances Kamm suggests that killing in cases she
describes as “mere resistance” is justifiable independently of its further useful consequences. Id.
 65. MCMAHAN, supra note 58, at 8. 
66. See id. This interpretation is presupposed by Firth & Quong, supra note 30, at 
691. 
67. See MCMAHAN, supra note 58, at 8. 
68. Id.
 69. See John Danaher, Moore on Justifying Retributivism (Part One), PHIL.
DISQUISITION (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:29 PM), philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2011/09/ 
moore-on-justifying-retributivism-part.html [https://perma.cc/F9WU-9BYK]. 
70. See DEP’T OF POLITICS & INT’L RELATIONS, OXFORD INST. FOR ETHICS, LAW &
ARMED CONFLICT, JUSTIFYING PREVENTIVE HARM:RETRIBUTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE APPROACHES
1 (2017), https://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/english/research/projects/cl/events/conferences/elac-
conference-2017_justifying-preventive-harm.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC99-EH2Y].
71. See RAYMUND SCHWAGER, MUST THERE BE SCAPEGOATS? VIOLENCE AND
REDEMPTION IN THE BIBLE 175 (Maria L. Assad trans., 2d ed. 1987). 
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powerful, than the competitive principle that assesses permissible harming— 
absent desert—in consequentialist terms.  Why should we be so quick to 
embrace the consequentialist demand that requires IV to further an objective 
or goal when so many of our actions are governed by deontological constraints 
that require us not to maximize good consequences?72  Any number of 
deontological constraints—for example, the constraint against breaking a 
solemn deathbed promise—are amenable to a similar analysis.73  Here, as
in many other situations, the good created by conforming to a principle 
against promise-breaking is not easily represented instrumentally.74  I contend 
this value is better depicted both non-consequentially as well as impersonally. 
I believe that yet another deontological constraint we should include in
our moral inventory is that persons are permitted not to maximize good 
consequences when so doing involves a capitulation of good to evil. 
My account has at least two advantages.  First, if IV is permitted to
injure WA because her scratch instantiates the principle that good should 
not capitulate to evil, it should be clear why our judgment in favor of her 
act does not permit what Helen Frowe calls “deferred harming.”75 The 
injury is permitted only when IV is actually failing to capitulate to WA’s 
onslaught.  If IV’s surviving spouse tracks down WA and wounds him the 
next day, after IV herself has been killed, some other principle, if any,
would have to be produced to justify his act.  Perhaps such a principle can
be produced—such as the principle that WA deserves to be harmed—but 
it need not be identical to whatever principle allows IV to injure WA while 
the attack is ongoing.  Second, I asked whether those who believe IV’s 
scratch is permissible because of a vindication of her honor would withdraw 
their permission if they learned that IV does not care one whit about her
honor and is motivated instead by her revulsion of the villainous WA. As
long as IV is aware WA is acting wrongly and thus does capitulate to him, I
am tempted to say that she implements a justificatory principle when she
inflicts a futile injury on him.76
 72. See Alexander & Moore, supra note 19. 
73. Uwe Steinhoff, Book Review, KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. (Oct. 20, 2015)
(reviewing MATTHEW H. KRAMER, TORTURE AND MORAL INTEGRITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY (2014)), https://kiej.georgetown.edu/matthew-h-kramer-torture-and-moral-integrity-
a-philosophical-enquiry-oxford-university-press-2014/ [https://perma.cc/3BN4-5AGZ].
74. See Allen Habib, Promises, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 10, 2008), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/#CriActUti [https://perma.cc/Z6NY-Y9CX].
75. FROWE, supra note 10, at 108. 
76. I doubt IV implements the justificatory principle I identify whatever her motivations
may be; sheer sadism does not suffice to render her conduct permissible.  Still, I leave 
open the difficult problem of specifying the exact content of the beliefs or motivations she 
must have to implement this principle.
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If IV produces an impersonal value in scratching WA, we can concede, 
with McMahan, that the injury she causes to WA is also an intrinsic disvalue.77 
Admittedly, a world with more injury contains less personal value—ceteris
paribus—than a world with less.78  To that extent, it follows that the world 
in which IV injures WA includes less value than a world in which IV 
simply yields.  Thus in one respect, the world in which WA is injured is 
worse. In another respect, however, this world is better.  Although this 
admission may help to explain our ambivalence about what IV is permitted 
to do to WA, I see no deep paradox here.  I do not allege that the injury
inflicted on the villainous WA has a different valence than an injury inflicted 
on persons who lack culpability.  I do not claim, in other words, that what 
is ordinarily and otherwise bad, that is, an injury, becomes good when inflicted
on a wrongful aggressor such as WA.  Such claims about a change in valence 
might be true, but I hope not to depend on them.  Instead, I am perfectly willing 
to allow that IV’s act of futile self-defense in my original case creates at
least two values, one negative—the injury to WA—and the other positive— 
the implementation of the principle that good should not capitulate to evil. 
The first negative value is personal, whereas the second positive value is,
at least partly, impersonal.  When two values are created, one bad and the
other good, we have little recourse except to balance and weigh them to 
decide whether more or less value is created all-things-considered. 
If I am correct, we must determine whether the positive impersonal 
value created by conformity with the principle that good should not
capitulate to evil outweighs the negative personal value caused by the
injury.  To make this decision, we would have to decide not only whether
IV produces an impersonal value, but also how much impersonal good she 
produces. For all I know, the amount of this impersonal good is small or
even infinitesimal.  Moreover, even if we could quantify the amount of 
this impersonal good with tolerable precision, we would not have reached
any significant insights into how impersonal goods are to be weighed
against competing personal goods.  I certainly have no formula that shows 
the positive impersonal value outweighing the negative personal value, so
that the good of failing to capitulate to evil outweighs the bad of inflicting 
an injury.  Those who share my initial intuition that the behavior of IV is 
permissible had better agree that whatever value she creates is greater than
the disvalue she creates.  But I see no way to prove the balancing comes
 77.  See MCMAHAN, supra note 58, at 8. 
78. See Asa Kasher, The Principle of Distinction, 6 J. MIL. ETHICS 152, 154 (2007). 
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out the way I favor.  Competing values and reasons are notoriously hard
to weigh,79 and these difficulties are compounded when one of the competing 
values is impersonal and the other is personal.  Philosophers try hard to 
construct examples in which one of many possible morally relevant factors is
isolated, but few cases in the real world correspond to this stipulation.80 
When a particular example involves, for example, an allowing rather than 
a doing, and an instance of foresight rather than intention, and a party who 
bears some fault for the predicament, moral philosophers must give one 
principle priority over another if they hope to reach an all-things-considered 
judgment of what conduct is permissible.81 
Other controversies share the conceptual framework I have constructed
about futile self-defense. Consider familiar problems in justifying punishment.82 
Do justified punishments create more intrinsic value than disvalue?  For 
whom is justified punishment good?  Sometimes these difficult questions 
are made easier by alleging that what seems to be a clear instance of the 
intrinsic disvalue of punishment—namely, the suffering of those who are 
subjected to it—is no longer bad when suffering is deserved.83  According 
to this train of thought, desert cancels the badness of the suffering of those 
who deserve to be punished.84  Although cancellation may be an acceptable
part of a retributivist strategy to justify punishment, it is certainly not a 
necessary part of such a strategy.85 It is not part of the strategy I am inclined
to adopt.  A retributivist can concede that the suffering inherent in punishment
is not cancelled and remains bad, even when it is deserved, without conceding 
too much to his opponents.  Although this suffering may be bad, it is not 
as bad as undeserved suffering; its badness is offset to some extent by the 
good that is attained by conformity with a principle of retributive justice.86 
Most importantly for present purposes, this good is best construed as impersonal; 
it need not be good for anyone.  The impersonal value of retributive justice 
differentiates it from vengeance, which, if good at all, is presumably good 
79. See generally WEIGHING REASONS (Errol Lord & Barry Maguire eds., 2016) 
(discussing several alternatives to competing values and reasons).
80. See Henry S. Richardson, Moral Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 
11, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-moral/ [https://perma.cc/XNA8-8DRZ]. 
81. See Alida Liberman & Mark Schroeder, Commitment: Worth the Weight, in WEIGHING 
REASONS, supra note 79, at 104, 104. 
82. As Michael Moore indicates, “punishing the guilty achieves something good—
namely, justice.”  MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 111 (1997).
83. See Feldman & Skow, supra note 19. 
84. See, e.g., Retributivism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
85. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS
258 (2008).
86. Id. at 269–70. 
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for the person who inflicts it.87  Admittedly, we would have to decide that 
the impersonal value of conforming to a principle of retributive justice is 
substantial if it is to outweigh the personal badness of the suffering of 
those who are punished.  And we also may need to decide whether punishing
the deserving creates more impersonal good than would be produced by
conforming to a more refined principle—punishing the deserving creates 
intrinsic value, but only when instrumental value is thereby produced. As 
I have indicated, however, it is extraordinarily difficult to move beyond 
intuitions and decide which exact principle to accept or how to demonstrate 
that one intrinsic value is weightier than another—especially when one is
personal and the other is not.88 
However much weight we assign to the competing values in my original
example, it should be clear this balance is affected when this case is 
modified in the following way.  Suppose the injury IV is able to inflict is
futile in its inability to prevent present or future aggression but is quite severe. 
Instead of merely scratching WA, IV succeeds in breaking both his arms and
legs. As so revised, the personal disvalue suffered by WA is far greater
than in my original example.  Thus more of whatever impersonal good IV 
attains by not yielding to evil is needed to outweigh it.  I have no clear 
idea whether there is a point at which futile injuries inflicted by IV on WA 
become too severe to be permissible.  Perhaps this point is reached when 
many WAs threaten IV, and she can severely—but futilely—injure each of
them.  Numbers count in any judgment that requires balancing. In any event,
my way of conceptualizing this example allows us to understand why such
a point may well exist.
If WA may be injured, and IV is permitted to injure him, I suppose there 
must be some property or characteristic of WA in virtue of which this 
injury is permissible. This property or characteristic must allow the infliction
of injury, even though it need not make the world a better place.  Arguably, 
this property should be called liability: a property that persons come to
acquire in virtue of their wrongful aggression.  But it does not ultimately
matter what this property is called; the point is that its possession allows
WA to be harmed by IV even though no present or future harm will be
 87. See PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 685–86 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 
2000).
88. To be clear, I do not allege that what IV does to WA is punishment.  Instead,
I allege only that the normative considerations governing punishment may share a similar 
conceptual structure to those involving futile self-defense. The permissibility of both may 
require the introduction of impersonal values. 
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averted. Many skeptics simply do not believe any such property can or
does exist. Their ground for thinking otherwise is, inter alia, that any such 
property would allow harmful conduct that makes the world better for no
one.  They cannot seem to get their heads around the claim that any such
property can exist.  I have tried to appeal to impersonal values as a possible 
explanation of how such a property might exist when IV inflicts a futile 
injury on WA. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Most respondents initially report the intuition that an innocent victim 
may inflict an injury on a wrongful aggressor even when she is somehow 
certain that so doing will prevent wrongful aggression on neither the 
present nor a future occasion.89  However, a few philosophers reluctantly
abandon this sensible intuition.90  They do so because they are unable to 
bring it into reflective equilibrium with a number of judgments they make
about other specific cases or general principles.  In particular, it is not easy
to understand what good acts of futile self-defense might achieve.  Further,
harmful acts that achieve no good are difficult to justify because they seem 
to be unnecessary and therefore gratuitous. 
The typical way to attempt to salvage the intuition that acts of futile 
self-defense can be permissible is to contend that they satisfy the necessity
constraint by promoting a valuable goal or objective.91  All previous such 
efforts, I believe, have contended that IV achieves a personal good—a good
for her—when she inflicts a futile injury on WA.  She might, for example,
salvage her dignity or self-respect.  I have suggested we need not suppose
IV furthers an objective when she injures IV.  All she needs is a reason
that justifies her conduct, and conformity with at least some such justifying 
reasons need not further a goal or increase a value.  More importantly, any 
value that is created by IV’s conduct need not be personal.  The question 
of when impersonal value is created and the problem of weighing it against
the creation of a personal disvalue—namely, the injury to WA—to reach
an all-things-considered judgment of permissibility, is clearly difficult.  These
matters invite question-begging; one simply reports the balancing comes 
out to vindicate the intuitive judgments favored by whoever purports to 
89.  Steinhoff, for one, endorses this view.  See Steinhoff, supra note 12, at 62. 
90. See, e.g., Joshua Glasgow, Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: John Gardner and
Francois Tanguay-Renaud’s “Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense” and Jeff McMahan’s




91. See, e.g., BOAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW 231–33 (2006). 
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weigh the competing considerations.  The difficulty of these issues helps 
to explain why many questions about futile self-defense seem intractable. 
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